In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.
Introduction
In an earlier paper of the author, ( [1] ), it was introduced and solved what was called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues of cooperative TU games. The present paper is starting with two examples of Semivalues (see [2] 
To find an allocation for the win offered by the grand coalition, compute for this game the Shapley Value, one of the efficient Semivalues:
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and notice that the Core of the game is empty. Hence, the value can not belong to the Core, it is not coalitional rational, even though it is efficient. Clearly, the grand coalition is unstable and may not be formed; for example the players one and two may threaten to form the coalition {1, 2} and take from { } ( )
equal wins, that is 1/2, which are better than the one third offered by the value.
The same thing may be said about any other coalition with two players. This would justify for the three competing players to create an agreement, namely: to play a new game, with the same Shapley Value, but in which the value will be coalitional rational, that is will be belonging to the Core of that game.
In an earlier work (see [1] 
Then, as shown in [1] , (Th.2), the coefficients of the expansion of the given game in the potential basis of the vector space of three person TU games are 2  2  3  2  3  2  3  2  3  2  2  3  2  3  2  3  2  3   1  1  1  2  1  3  2  1  1  2,1 1, 
S S S S S S S S S
If we take 123 2 3 c = , satisfying the inequality, then from (5) we obtain one game which is in the Inverse Set and has the Shapley Value in the Core: 2  1 0, 2 0, 3 0, 1, 2  ,  3  2  2  1,3 , 2,3 , 1, 2,3 1. 
We may easily compute the Shapley Value of this game, to check that we get the Shapley Value (2) and this is in the Core, hence it is coalitional rational. As (7) shows, there is an infinite set of other such games, and also an infinite set of games for which the Shapley Value is not in the Core. We have found a solution for our problem; the case of the Shapley Value for n-person games will be further discussed. Note that the problem we discussed is easier, because the value considered is efficient. For a nonefficient Semivalue, the situation is more complex, as we shall see below, because in this case, the coalitional rationality should be defined. We start again by an example, in which the value is the well known Banzhaf Value, a Semivalue that is nonefficient, in general, even though it may be given an example where it is efficient. 
and take the Banzhaf Value, which is also a particular Semivalue. We obtain { } ( )
which is nonefficient, so that the Banzhaf Value does not belong to the Core. The solution of the Inverse Problem can be also obtained from [1] . As the weight vectors for the Banzhaf Value of a three person game are
the coefficients of the expansion for our Inverse Set are 
Now, the scalar form of the Inverse Set relative to the Banzhaf Value (see [1] , Example 2), is Note that in general the efficiency is missing; therefore we shall define the Coalitional rationality by means of the Power Game in which the efficiency holds. Recall that the Power Game, for this game (see [4] , 3.1), is given by
.
We can compute the Power Game of any game in the above family: 
where the Banzhaf Value of the initial game occurs. Further, by definition, the Banzhaf Value will be coalitional rational if it belongs to the Power Core, in which it is already efficient. As the Banzhaf Value is positive, we may consider the subfamily of games similar to the one used in the previous section. Then, the Power Core, relative to the Banzhaf Value is defined by the system ( ) 2  123  3  1  3  123  2   2  3  123  1   1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3   2  2  , ,  2 
If we take 123 3 4 c = , then the game which has the Banzhaf Value in the Power Core is the game
and the corresponding Power Game, computed by (14), is
Recall that the Banzhaf Value of the above game ( )
and now we may check that it is belonging to the Core of the above game 
These two examples show how we can find for a given game, with a computed Banzhaf Value, a game with the same Banzhaf Value, for which the considered value is coalitional rational. Now, we can go to a TU games with any number of players, to consider the new general problem: for a given game and some Semivalue, efficient or not, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is efficient and coalitional rational. As it has been seen above, we have to give the general definition for coalitional rationality, in the case of Semivalues for games with any number of players, to be applicable for either efficient, or nonefficient Semivalues.
Main Results and Procedures

The Shapley Value for Any Number of Players
We started with the case of three players in 1.1; use the same procedure with 
we may write the scalar form of these games 
where the last inequality follows from (*), that is the coalitional rationality holds Example 3: To see the procedure for a larger game, take the four person game ( ) 
from (24), the scalar form of games in the subfamily of the Inverse Set is ( )
then, the Shapley Value of this new game will be the same, and also it will be coalitional rational. The game ( ) , N w is a solution for our problem. Note that if 3 n = the inequality will be the same as (6) from the previous paragraph 1.1.
Note also that the computation of the game in the Inverse Set has been very easy, because we used the Formulas (24), from the proof of Theorem 1, some strategy which will be extended below to the Semivalues.
The Semivalues for any Number of Players
As in the previous section, any TU game may get a representation in terms of a potential basis of the vector space, as shown in [1] ; the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue is given by a similar formula. The difference is that the basic vectors are given by more general expressions, depending on the weight vectors of the Semivalues. Thus, by using their formulas from the Appendix, the characteristic functions of the games in the almost null family of the Inverse Set are different of (24), namely
,
where the Semivalue of the original game is
Of course, for the weights of The Shapley Value, we get (24). We proved the following result:
Theorem 2: Let a Semivalue on the set of games with the set of players N be defined by the weight vector (24), and these last Formulas (24) will be giving a solution for our problem, if and only if the parameter satisfies the inequality (*). Hence, choose a value for the parameter and obtain one solution by (24).
As seen in (31), in general the efficiency is missing; In this way, to be able to solve our problem we should use a more general definition of the coalitional rationality. This will be done by means of the so called Power Game, as shown in Section 1.2. In the Power Game our given Semivalue of the Inverse Game is efficient. Then, we define the coalitional rationality for any Semivalue as the appurtenance to the Core of the Power Game, that we called the Power Core (see also [4] ). Of course, if it happens that the Semivalue is efficient, as it was shown in some example below, the Power Game is the game itself and the coalitional rationality is the same as in the previous section. Notice that to shorten the computation of the Power Game for the games in the Inverse Set relative to the Semivalue, either we use the definition similar to (14), or we may use the formula for the Power Game ( ) , N π Ψ , shown in the Appendix, (see [4] ). We obtain:
The last equality follows from a longer computation. Notice that in (33) the weights of the coalitions for the Semivalue disappeared from the expression of the Power Game.. Thus, beside the efficiency and the nonnegativity of the components, the conditions expressing the appurtenance of the Semivalue to the
Now, a result similar to the theorem 1 could be easily proved:
Theorem 3: For a TU game with a nonefficient and nonnegative Semivalue, there is a TU game in which the Semivalue is coalitional rational, if and only if (**) 
Now, the computation of the Power Game gives the game ( )
We may verify that the Banzhaf Value of the game ( ) 
The Power Game of this last game is
We may check that the Banzhaf Value of the game (38) is the same and it belongs to the Power Core, hence this game is another solution for our problem.
As shown by theorem 3, there is an infinite set of games which represent solutions for our problem, and an infinite set of games for which the Semivalue is not coalitional rational.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to stress out the technique based upon The above examples show applications of the procedure just explained.
To understand better the concept of coalitional rationality for Semivalues, a few remarks are useful: a) Return to Example 4 and the first solution for the above game, where
and the other null values of the characteristic function were omitted. It is true that the Banzhaf Value is the same as for the given game, and this belongs to the Core of the Power Game, which is 
different of the Banzhaf value for the original game, and this is not efficient, hence it does not belong to the Core of the Power Game. b) As it was said above, it is possible that a Semivalue, which is not the Shapley Vlue, is efficient; for example consider again the Banzhaf Value, but take the game ( ) 
which is efficient; we may check that it is also coalitional rational, as it belongs to the Core. In fact, for this game the Banzhaf Value equals the Shapley value, which incidentally is coalitional rational for this game. Of course, if the Banzhaf
Value is efficient, but it is not coalitional rational, we may use the procedure discussed for efficient values in 2.1, to get another game in which the value is the same, and it is also coalitional rational. The same problem of coalitional rationality for these Semivalues has been discussed by the author in another reference [5] . This type of Semivalues was introduced by A. M. Puente in [6] .
A final discussion about the present paper is appropriate: we have shown how to solve the stated problem of finding one game with the desired property. As shown by formulas (*) or (**), there are many other solutions, hence new research results on the same problem are possible in the near future. Note that a few formulas from [3] were needed, and they will be given in the Appendix.
